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G32The post-Global Financial Crisis period shows a surge in corporate leverage in emergingmarkets and a number of
countries with deteriorated corporate financial fragility indicators (Altman's Z-score). Firm size plays a critical
role in the relationship between leverage, firm fragility and exchange rate movements in emerging markets.
While the relationship between firm-leverage and distress scores varies over time, the relationship between
firm size and corporate vulnerability is relatively time-invariant. All else equal, large firms in emerging markets
aremorefinancially vulnerable and also systemically important. Consistentwith the granular origins of aggregate
fluctuations in Gabaix (2011), idiosyncratic shocks to the sales growth of large firms are positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with GDP growth in our emerging markets sample. Relatedly, the negative impact of exchange





Large Firms1 The growth in corporate profits has slowed considerably, and the return on invested
capital in emerging-marketfirms has significantly declined since thefinancial crisis. As ev-
idence, emergingmarkets usually trade at lower valuations than their advanced-economy1. Introduction
Therewasarapidcredit expansion inemerging-market countries in the
aftermath of theGlobal Financial Crisis (GFC). A surge in foreign borrowing
and deterioration in net external debt positions accompanied the increase
in domestic credit (BIS, 2014; IMF, 2015). The non-financial corporate sec-
tor accounts for the lion's share of this surge in leverage including signifi-
cant increases in international bond issuance (Fig. 1). The total domestic
and foreign debt of emerging market-based non-financial firms rose from
$2.4 trillion to $3.7 trillion, and outstanding international bonds grew
from $360 billion to $1.1 trillion between 2007 and 2015 (BIS, 2016).s andDebt inEmergingMarkets,
is Servén and Ramón Piñeda for
ebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Nicholas
ul comments and suggestions.
ss School, Morgan 461, Boston, 
e.unc.edu (G. Asis), 
.ch (U. Panizza).Monetary policy normalization in advanced economies, rising
emerging-market sovereign debt premia, low corporate profitability and
market valuations all together have the potential to cause severe liquidity
problems for emergingmarket firms.1 In fact, following taper talk and the
lift-off fromthe zero lowerbound in theUnitedStates, tight dollar funding
conditions have led to sharp reversals in capital flows to emerging
markets.2,3 Rising fears, notably Turkey, are that normalizing monetarycounterparts, and while these relative valuations increased in the aftermath of the GFC,
emerging markets are trading at a discount again.
2 See for example, Bloomberg. “Emerging Markets in May Saw Biggest Outflows in
18 Months”, June 5, 2018; Reuters, “Emerging markets set for $448 billion outflows this
year -IIF,” January 26, 2016.
3 A number of direct and indirect channels can transmit shocks to highly leveraged non-
financial corporates to the domestic economy. For example, a deterioration of credit qual-
ity of corporate borrowers or a sudden withdrawal of funds from the domestic financial
system by firms that are unable to roll-over their international obligations can impair
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Fig. 1. Total Credit to the Non-financial Sector in Emerging Markets (% of GDP).
Source: Authors' calculations based on BIS total credit statistics. (Decomposition across sectors is only available after 2006)policy conditions in the US could trigger waves of corporate failures in a
number of emerging economies. Understanding the potential vulnerabil-
ities, however, requires that we knowmore about the state of emerging
market corporate balance sheets and their hitherto unexplored impact
on the macroeconomy. Our paper aims to do so.
The paper'smain contribution is to investigate the role of large firms
in the emerging market economies and whether their vulnerabilities
portend adverse macroeconomic consequences. Gabaix (2011) notes
that the largest firms dominate economic activity in advanced countries
and shocks to the largest firms can affect aggregate output as these
shocks do not get diversified in the aggregate data.4
We start by showing thatfirm size plays a critical role in the relation-
ship between leverage, firm fragility and exchange rate movements in
emerging markets. We also show that while the relationship between
leverage and distress scores varies over time, the relationship between
firm size and corporate vulnerability is relatively time-invariant. To
our knowledge this result is new. Next, we carefully examine whether
the most leveraged and financially fragile firms in emerging markets
are also the most systemically important. We believe that this is the
first paper to formally test Gabaix's (2011) granular origins of aggregate
fluctuations hypothesis using emerging market data. The details of the
analysis follow below.
We use detailed financial statement information fromWorldscope
and Orbis for a broad cross-section of emerging markets over a twenty-
year period to study the relationship between firm characteristics such
as size, leverage and corporatefinancial fragility over time. As a summary
measure of corporate fragility, we use the widely used Altman's Z-score
measure adapted to the emerging market context (Altman, 2005).5
We begin by documenting the cross-country patterns in the
Altman's Z-score for the emerging markets in our sample. Next, using
detailed firm-level information, we investigate the relationship be-
tween leverage and corporate financial fragility with particular4 See also Acemoglu et al. (2016).
5 The original Altman's Z-score is a linear combination of five corporate income and bal-
ance sheet values tomeasure the financial health of a company: the ratios of working cap-
ital, retained earnings, and operating income to total assets, the book value of assets to
total liabilities and the sales to total assets. By combining various aspects of firm opera-
tions, it paints an overall picture of corporate health (Altman, 1968).emphasis on the role of firm size. We also examine the impact of mac-
roeconomic and institutional factors such as exchange rates, economic
growth, and financial globalization interacted with leverage on corpo-
rate distress scores.
We find that in the post-GFC period, many countries have higher le-
verage and are close to or in the Altman Z-score “grey zone” implying a
higher risk offinancial distress. Turkey now in distress territory is perhaps
a good example. Regression estimates show that leverage has a negative
correlation with the Z score, i.e., scores for firms with high leverage are
closer to the distressed range. Further, large firms and highly levered
firms are more financially vulnerable. Interestingly, the magnitude of
the coefficient on firm size almost quadruples with the introduction of
country-year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
countries and is eight times larger with firm-fixed effects. Moreover,
across alternative definitions of firm size, the relationship with financial
vulnerability remains negative and highly statistically significant. Large
firms, therefore, appear to be a principal source of corporate financial vul-
nerability in emerging markets.
We also find that while the relationship between leverage and fragil-
ity varies over time, the firm characteristic that is consistently significant
and robust isfirm size. To explain theobserved country-year heterogene-
itywe conjecture is that if firms borrow in foreign currency, leveragewill
likelyhave aparticularly adverse impact on corporatefinancial fragility in
times of currency depreciation. The data suggest that indeed the interac-
tion effect between leverage and currency depreciation is negative and
statistically significant. The inclusion of country-year fixed effects rules
out any concern of direct reverse causality, i.e., the possibility that an in-
crease in firm fragility leads to currency depreciation.
We undertake a number of tests and explore alternative explana-
tions to ensure the robustness of our results. The relationship between
firm size and financial fragility is robust to economic recessions and
tighter financial conditions. Also, the effect of firm size and leverage
conditional on changes in the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S.
dollar are robust to leverage interactions with inflation, financial devel-
opment, and the updated Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) index of
financial globalization. Importantly, the size variable remains negative,
highly statistically significant with a remarkably stable coefficient mag-
nitude across all the specifications.
6 Pomerlano (1998) uses firm-level data and finds that excessive leverage and poor fi-
nancial performance in the corporate sector caused the Asian financial crisis. Ghosh et al.
(2002) also show that in 1995–96 several East Asian countries had debt ratios and shares
of short-term debt which were significantly higher than debt ratios and short-term debt
shares in OECD countries. Claessens et al. (2000) suggest that corporate financial risk fac-
torsmay have been an amplifying factor in the crisis. Corsetti et al. (1999) also explore the
root causes of the Asian Financial crisis.
7 Other papers in this literature include but are not limited to Alfaro and Kancuzk,
(2013), Alfaro et al. (2017), Bruno and Shin (2015b), Claessens et al. (2015), Eichengreen
and Tong (2015), Du and Schreger (2016), Galindo et al. (2003), Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2017), Druck et al. (2017), Avdjiev et al. (2018).
8 TheWorldscope database provides detailed historical financial statement information
for theworld's leading public and private companies. Osiris, published by Bureau van Dijk,
has information as well on listed, and major unlisted/delisted, companies around the
world. All data for tangible fixed assets is also from Osiris. While extracting data from Osi-
ris, we restricted the sample to include sales information.
9 Alternative sources, such as Orbis data, do not provide consistent historical data for
private and public firms for emerging markets. For example, Di and Levchenko's (2013)
show that between 2006 and 2008 there were only 44 countries (mostly OECD and East-
ern European countries) for which Orbis had firm-level data on sales for at least 1000
firms.
10 We supplement these countries with Argentina, Jordan, Morocco, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Vietnam. Egypt, Qatar and UAE are not in our sample due to data availability. Also,
we do not include Greece as an emerging market.Additional tests reveal that the relationship between firm size and
corporate financial fragility is robust to the survivorship bias of firms,
excluding China from the specifications and the use of a constant sam-
ple. We also find a differential interaction effect of leverage and
exchange rate changes on corporate financial fragility that depends on
whether emerging market currencies are strengthening or weakening
the interaction effect of leverage and change in the exchange rate on
Z-scores conditional on currency depreciation is negative and statisti-
cally significant. Concerning sector-specificity, the estimations show a
larger and statistically significant interaction effect between leverage
and exchange rates for non-tradable industries and a smaller and insig-
nificant coefficient for the tradable sector.
A potential concern is that for variables measured with error, our
results may suffer from attenuation bias that is amplified by the pres-
ence of firm and country-year fixed effects. To address attenuation
bias, as well as other remaining endogeneity concerns, we use two in-
struments for the exchange rate. One based on world capital flows
data (Bussière et al., 2015, and Alfaro et al., 2018) interacted with the
time-varying country-specific values of the Chinn-Ito index for financial
openness and a second instrument that uses currency weights com-
putedbyBénétrix et al. (2015) to build an exogenous shock to thefinan-
cially weighted exchange rate. The instrumental variables specifications
confirm that the interaction effect between leverage and the exchange
rate and firm size on corporate distress scores is negative and statisti-
cally significant. Importantly, the coefficient magnitudes in the instru-
mental variable regressions are much larger alleviating concerns about
attenuation bias.
Next, we turn to the secondmain contribution of the paper. A funda-
mental question is whether the findings about firm size and leverage
documented above can have adverse macroeconomic consequences
especially with monetary policy normalization in advanced economies.
To answer this question, we explore the role of large firms and their im-
portance for the overall economic performance in emerging markets.
Consistent with Gabaix (2011) we find that large firms are systemically
important—idiosyncratic shocks to large firms significantly correlate
with GDP growth in our sample of emerging markets. We see that
while large firms are less levered than small firms, they may have a
more risky type of leverage as large firm performance in terms of sales
growth deteriorates more significantly in response to exchange rate de-
preciation.While this result holds for the average country in our sample,
we also find that there is substantial cross-country heterogeneity. In
conjunction with the contributions that large firms make to the overall
economic performance in emerging markets, the leverage vulnerabil-
ities of these firms may, therefore, warrant particular attention from
policymakers.
Note again that there is considerable concern about the recent in-
crease in dollar borrowing by emerging market firms (McCauley et al.
2015, Avdjiev et al., 2014, and Acharya et al., 2015). Our paper is the
first to provide evidence of the macroeconomic consequences of the
links between leverage, currency movements, and firm size. Given
that disaggregate data on the liability composition (currency, maturity,
type of lender) of non-financial firms are not available our tests are a
valuable and novel contribution to the literature. Implicitly, there is an
intimate link between the vulnerabilities of systemically large firms,
bailout guarantees, andmoral hazard issues in emergingmarket lending
where widespread corporate debt vulnerabilities can turn into full-
blown financial crises. Once again, Turkey is a case in point.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, the paper
contributes to the literature on the recent evolution of corporate debt
in the aftermath of the GFC. IMF (2015) documents the main trends
and shows that global factors drive the increase in corporate leverage
following the GFC. This finding is in line with Shin's (2013) view that
the response to the crisis led to a sudden increase in global liquidity.
Acharya et al. (2015) present several case studies and evaluate vulnera-
bilities and potential policy responses.More generally, this paper relates
to the literature documenting the association between rapid creditgrowth and the building of corporate leverage and financial crises
(Mendoza and Terrones, 2008, and Schularick and Taylor, 2012). The
paper is also related to the literature on the origins of the Asian Financial
Crisis also credited with corporate financial roots.6 Our paper is also re-
lated to the growing literature on the financial channel of exchange rate
changes (Bruno and Shin, 2015a).7
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the firm-level
data. Section 3 provides detailed stylized facts about leverage and cor-
porate vulnerabilities in emerging markets including the build-up of
corporate debt and our methodology for measuring corporate financial
fragility. Section 4 presents firm-level regression results that explore
factors that drive corporate fragility in emerging markets. Section 5 an-
alyzes the relationship between firm size, corporate fragility and the
macroeconomy. Section 6 concludes.
2. The data
This paper uses firm-level data fromWorldscope (gathered through
Datastream) and Osiris that provide information going back to the
1990s.8 The data provide a long time series that allows us to exploit
the variation in the relationship between leverage, firm-size and corpo-
rate financial fragility in emerging markets over two decades and span-
ning a number of crises. Both sources provide detailed historical
information for listed and unlisted firms for awide sample of countries.9
We compared Worldscope and Osiris' coverage for emerging markets
and chose the data source with themost data availability for each coun-
try. Osiris had better coverage for China and India, while Worldscope
dominated for all other countries.
The sample consists of data on non-financial firms from 1992 to
2014 for the main countries classified as emerging markets from the
MSCI's emerging market index.10 These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey, and Vietnam. Since coverage of Eastern European countries is
extremely sparse, we group together firms from Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia into ‘Eastern Europe’.
Our final sample includes all companies that have data for each indi-
cator of firm performance described below. The number of companies
with data for every variable and year of interest is too small to create a
balanced sample.Nonetheless,wehaveperformed theanalysismaintain-
ing a balanced sample during different periods, obtaining similar results
We exclude outliers and all noticeable errors in the data. The sample
varies from a maximum of 7972 firms with data on leverage totaling
45,104 firm-year observations to a minimum of 2926 firms (13,653
Table 1
Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median P25 P75 Min Max
Firm-level variables
Leverage 45,104 66.36 70.16 43.43 11.91 95.44 0.00 254.89
Leveragea 10,491 69.94 70.10 47.84 16.78 99.31 0.00 254.85
Z Score 13,653 7.49 4.39 6.86 4.38 10.31 0.18 16.55
Modified Z-Score 13,653 25.63 3.35 25.15 23.53 27.42 19.92 33.26
Total Assetsa,b 13,653 287.1 536.4 9.01 1.31 226.9 0.83 1652
Investmentc 11.219 0.09 0.28 0.04 −0.07 0.18 −0.33 0.93
Country-level variables
ΔEX 401 0.07 0.20 0.02 −0.03 0.09 −0.25 1.00
GR_GDP 388 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.10 −0.06 0.12
Inflation 400 64.6 37.0 69.9 40.8 94.2 −1.4 143.6
FINDEV 401 59.0 42.1 42.0 24.9 96.7 8.3 166.5
LMF 334 1.15 0.56 1.03 0.78 1.36 0.38 3.86
All variables are Winsorized at 5% (a) Only firms for which we have data on the Z-Score; (b) millions USD; (c) Investment is defined as percentage change in fixed assets.firm-year observations) with enough data to compute Altman's Emerg-
ing Market Z-score, our main measure of corporate fragility. The coun-
tries with most firms in the database are China, India, and South
Korea, and with the least Eastern Europe.
Column1of Table A1 in theAppendix shows total sales offirms in our
database by country as a percentage of the country's totalmarket capital-
ization, as computed by theWorld Bank.Wefind this a bettermeasure of
sample coverage than Sales/GDP because the large majority of the firms
in our database are publicly listed, and the size of the listed market rela-
tive to GDP varies significantly by country, as Column 2 shows.3. Stylized facts: leverage and corporate vulnerabilities in emerging
markets
3.1. The build-up of corporate debt
The surge in borrowing by non-financial corporations was a key
driver of the increased leverage in emerging markets in the aftermath
of the global financial crisis.11 Over 2001–2007 average credit to the
non-financial sector in emerging market countries remained close to
120% of GDP. While the GFC caused a sudden reduction in credit, credit
started expanding rapidly in 2009 and reached 175% of GDP in 2015, a
67-percentage point increase with respect to the 2008 trough (Fig. 1).
Corporate debt went from 57% to 101% of GDP over 2008–15.
Domestic credit expansion in emerging markets was accompanied
by a surge in foreign borrowing.12 Non-financial corporations also11 Total cross-border claims on EMs by BIS reporting banks increased from $2.4 trillion in
2008 to a peak of $3.7 trillion on 2014. Data for 2015 indicates a $200 billion retreat, with
total cross-border claims standing just below $3.5 trillion. In 2007 foreign currency bonds
represented 16% of international debt by emerging market-based non-financial corpora-
tions and by 2014 the foreign currency share had grown to 22% (IMF, 2015). The share
of dollar-denominated bonds issued by non-financial corporations is higher than the over-
all share of dollar-denominated bonds. In 2015, borrowing by non-financial corporations
accounted for about 25% of emerging market cross-border borrowing from BIS reporting
banks. Total credit denominated in US dollars to non-bank borrowers, resident in emerg-
ing markets increased from 1.6 trillion in 2008 to 3 trillion at the end of 2014. Over the
same period of time total credit denominated to non-bank borrowers, resident in emerg-
ing markets denominated in euro and Japanese yen also increased but at a much smaller
rate 9and starting from a smaller base) than dollar credit (data on foreign currency credit
to non-financial corporations are available the BIS Global Liquidity Indicators, Tables E2.1
E2.2, E2.3. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this data source.
12 Total cross-border claims on EMs by BIS reporting banks increased from $2.4 trillion in
2008 to a peak of $3.7 trillion on 2014. Data for 2015 indicates a $200 billion retreat, with
total cross-border claims standing just below $3.5 trillion. In 2007 foreign currency bonds
represented 16% of international debt by emerging market-based non-financial corpora-
tions and by 2014 the foreign currency share had grown to 22% (IMF, 2015). The share
of dollar-denominated bonds issued by non-financial corporations is higher than the over-
all share of dollar-denominated bonds. In 2015, borrowing by non-financial corporations
accounted for about 25% of emerging market cross-border borrowing from BIS reporting
banks. Also, see Borio et al. (2011), Avdjiev et al. (2012), Lane and McQuade, (2014).played a key role in international bond issuances. Over 2008–2015, out-
standing international bonds issued by non-financial corporations grew
from $360 billion (approximately 30% of total outstanding bonds) to
$1.1 trillion (N40% of total outstanding bonds). The increase in leverage
was particularly important in non-tradable cyclical sectors such as con-
struction. Further, the increase in leverage and foreign currency debt
documented above took place in an environment of ample global liquid-
ity and record low policy rates in advanced economies.13
For our sample of emerging markets firms, we use as a main indica-
tor of leverage the debt to equity ratio (a firm's total debt divided by its
common equity), which indicates howmuch debt a company is using to
finance its assets relative to its common equity. Average leverage in the
full sample is 66%, with a median value of 43% and ranges between 0
and 255%. Leverage is slightly higher for the subsample of firms for
which we have enough information to compute Altman's Z score (in
this case the average value of leverage is 69% with a median value of
48%, compare the first two rows of Table 1). Table A2 in the Appendix
presents a heat map for corporate leverage as the sales-weighted debt
to equity ratios across the emerging markets countries in our sample.
The heat map shows that average leverage increase from 72.8% in
the run up to the GFC (2003–2007) to 95.3% in the post-GFC period
(2008–2014)—a 22 percentage point increase in average leverage.14
On a country-by-country basis, post-GFC leverage is higher than its
pre-crisis average for every country in our sample. A t-test of means
confirms that the increase in leverage is statistically significant at the
5% level across the two sub-periods.
Here a point about the weighting strategy used in the heat map is
worth noting.We focus on sales-weighted leverage because tomeasure
the overall riskiness of corporate debt for the financial system in a coun-
try, we would like to assess the upper bound of the risk.15 If a few large
firms are also the ones with the highest leverage, it is desirable to give a
larger weight to these observations since arguably these firms have the
greatest potential to generate systemic risk—we focus on these large
firms in Section 5.13 Emergingmarket-based corporates have therefore borrowed at longermaturities and
lower yields. Maturity went from the pre-crisis average of 5 years to N6 years and average
yields decreased from 8 to 6% (IMF, 2015).
14 The averages of theheatmap donot perfectlymatch those in the summary statistics of
Table 1 because the heatmap shows sales-weighted averageswhile Table presents simple
averages.
15 In general, the weighted median measure attenuates the distributional consequences
of observations in the tails of a distribution. In many circumstances, this adjustment is
warranted to ensure that outliers do not drive the results. In other words, if a few obser-
vations skew the weighted mean, the weighted median that adjusts for non-uniform sta-
tistical weights and gives the 50% weighted percentile measure is the more appropriate
statistic. 14 out of 19 countries have a higher post-GFCweightedmedian (results available
upon request).
Table 2
Altman's EM Z-score and bond rating
Source: Altman (2005).
Z' Score Rating Z' Score Rating
Safe Zone N 8.15 AAA 5.65 – 5.85 BBB- Grey Zone
7.60 – 8.15 AA+ 5.25 – 5.65 BB+
7.30 – 7.60 AA 4.95 – 5.25 BB
7.00 – 7.30 AA_ 4.75 – 4.95 BB-
6.85 – 7.00 A+ 4.50 – 4.75 B+
6.65 – 6.85 A 4.15 – 4.50 B
6.40 – 6.65 A- 3.75 – 4.15 B-
6.25 – 6.40 BBB+ Distress Zone
5.85 – 6.25 BBB 3.20 – 3.75 CCC+
2.50 – 3.20 CCC
1.75 – 2.50 CCC-
b 1.75 D3.2. Measuring vulnerability: the Altman Z-score
Altman (1968) developed the first multivariate bankruptcy predic-
tion model and the index remains widespread in finance, accounting,
and macroeconomics research.16 While many alternative failure-
prediction models exist, the use of the Z-Score model continues as a
main or supporting tool for bankruptcy or financial distress prediction.
Initial tests revealed that the Altman Z-Score had a 72% accuracy rate
in predicting bankruptcy two years before the event, with a Type II
error that classifies the firm as bankrupt when it does not go bankrupt
of 6% (Altman, 1968). Subsequent testing over three decades showed
that the model was approximately 80%–90% accurate in predicting
bankruptcy one year before the event, with a Type II error of approxi-
mately 15%–20% (Altman, 1993, 2005).
The Z-score is a linear combination of five corporate income and bal-
ance sheet values to measure the financial health of a company: the ra-
tios of working capital, retained earnings, and operating income to total
assets, the book value of assets to total liabilities and the sales to total as-
sets. By combining various aspects offirmoperations, it paints an overall
picture of corporate health. The advantage of the approach is that
the different ranges of “safe”, “grey” and “distress” can be correlated
with corporate ratings letter grades used by credit rating agencies.
The Z-score statistics correspond to AAA to BBB for the safe zone, BBB-
to B- for the grey zone and CCC+ and below for the distress zone.
The original coefficient estimates compared publicly listed firms in
the manufacturing sector that had declared bankruptcy and those that
had survived, matched by various characteristics namely industry and
size (assets).17 Themeasurewas subsequentmodified to consider larger
sample of firms, including non-manufacturing (Altman Z"-Score) firms
and private firms (Altman Z'-Score).
Altman (2005) also proposed a version of the original Z-Score to ac-
count for different structural characteristics of emerging market firms;
e.g. he replaces the market value of assets to the book value to adjust
for the relative trading illiquidity in emergingmarkets compared to ad-
vanced economies.
Accordingly, as a summary measure of corporate fragility, we calcu-
late the Altman (2005) Emerging Market Z-score that is best suited to
assess the relative vulnerability of the sample of countries we consider16 Examples of papers in macroeconomics that have used Altman's measure include
Bernanke and Campbell (1988), Corbae and D'Erasmo (2017), in international
economics Ağca and Celasun (2012), in finance Fazzari et al. (1988), Graham et al.
(2008), Van Binsbergen et al. (2010), Acharya et al. (2011), Jacobson and Von Schedvin
(2015), Ben-David et al. (2016), De De Angelo et al. (2016), di Bonaccorsi and Kashyap
(2017).
17 The original Z-score, Z = 1.2 × 1 + 1.4 × 2 + 3.3 × 3 + 0.6 × 4 + 1.0 × 5, where
X1 =working capital / total assets, measuring liquid assets relative to the size of the com-
pany; X2= retained earnings / total assets, capturing earning ability;X3= earnings before
interest and taxes / total assets, capturing operating efficiency relative to assets; X4=mar-
ket value of equity / book value of total liabilities; X5 = sales / total assets capturing total
asset turnover.in this paper. The measure weighs four ratios constructed using the
firms' financial statements (working capital to total assets, retained
earnings to total assets, operating income to total assets, and book
value of equity to total liabilities)18:
EM Z−score ¼ 6:56X1 þ 3:26X2 þ 6:72X3 þ 1:05X4 þ 3:25
where X1 = working capital/ total assets, X2 = retained earnings /
total assets, X3 = operating income /total assets, X4 = book value of
equity /total liabilities. The constant term (derived from the median
Z`` score for bankrupt US entities) standardizes the analysis so “that a
default equivalent (D) is consistent with a score below zero.”
Lower Z-scores are associated with greater vulnerability and likeli-
hood of bankruptcy. Companies with EM Z-scores N5.85 are considered
to be in the “safe zone”, scores between 5.85 and 3.75 indicate vulnera-
bility, and scores below 3.75 indicate that the firm is in state of distress.
Table 2 from Altman (2005) compares Z-scores with bond ratings.
For the firms in our sample, Table A2 in the Appendix presents a heat
map for EM Z-score statistics for the countries in our sample. The table
presents cross-firm averages by country for the full sample (as for Le-
verage, we report weighted means), in the years leading up to the
GFC, and in the post-GFC period. Countries with higher Z-scores in the
post-GFC period are Colombia, Eastern Europe, Malaysia, South Korea,
and Indonesia. Note that South Korea was in the distress zone during
the Asian Financial crisis. However, nine countries in the sample are in
the grey or vulnerable zone. These countries include some of the largest
emerging markets in Asia (China, India and Turkey) and Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). In addition, thirteen countries in the
sample have lower average Z-scores in the post-GFC period compared
to pre-crisis. Although there are no countries in the distress zone post-
GFC, in addition to the countries in the grey zone, some of the countries
are also barely in the safe zone.
If the Altman Z-score provides a leading indicator of the potential for
distress, the data show that a broad set of emergingmarkets in the post-
GFC period face heightened corporate vulnerability. The average
winsorized emerging market Z-score in our sample is 7.50 and corre-
sponds to a AA rating in the safe zone. The Z-score ranges from 0.18 in
the distress zone to 16.55 in the safe zone (Table 1). We also build a
modified Z-score that does not include the book value of equity /total
liabilities. The modified Z-score has an average value of 25.63 and
ranges between 20 and 33.
To further validate our use of Altman's EM Z-score as a proxy for the
inverse of corporate financial fragility, we test its ability to predict exit
from the sample. We find that firms with low Z-scores are more likely
to exit the sample the next period. Specifically, we estimate the follow-
ing linear probabilitymodel (we obtain similar results if we use a probit
model):
Fit ¼ 25:18 − 0:14  Zi;t−1
0:65ð Þ 0:05ð Þ ð1Þ
where Fi,t is an indicator variable that takes a value of 100 if firm i is in
the sample in period t-1 but is not in the sample in period t and takes
value 0 if the firm is in the sample in both periods, and Zi,t−1 is the Z
score in period t-1. The point estimates suggest that in any given year
there is 25% probability that a firm will drop out of the sample, but
that this probability is lower for firms with a high Z score. Specifically,
a one standard deviation decrease, corresponding to a 4.4% decrease in
the Z-score is associated with a 0.7 percentage points increase in the18 The use of book value of equity, notmarket value,wasmotivated by a concern that eq-
uity markets may be less liquid than in developed markets. Altman (2005) adjusts the
measure to consider currency devaluation vulnerability, industry adjustments (relative
to U.S.); competitiveness position adjustment (dominant firms in the industry due to size,
political influence, etc.); special debt issue figure (collateral or bona fide, high-quality
guarantor); sovereign spread (comparison to US corporate bond of the same rating).
probability that the firm will not be in the sample in the following year
(this corresponds to a 3% increase in the unconditional probability of
exiting the sample). This outcome suggests that also in our sample of
firms the Z-score is a good proxy for distance to default.
We also find that the Z-score is correlated with default in the ex-
pected direction: A higher Z-score is associatedwith a lower probability
of default. We perform this exercise using Orbis data for 15 emerging
market countries (Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea) and 22 years (1996–2017), containing
a total of 735,426 firm-years.We construct a default dummy that equals
one on the year in which a firm's status changes from “Active” to “Bank-
ruptcy”, “Dissolved”, or “Dissolved (liquidation)”. There are 896
such cases. We find the correlation between Altman's EmergingMarket
Z-score and the default dummy is −0.0199, statistically significant at
the 1% level. The correlationwith themodified Z-score with no leverage
term is −0.0212, also significant at the 1% level.
Summary: While there is substantial cross-country heterogeneity in
the post-GFC period, our data suggest that a number of countries have
higher leverage and close to or in the “grey zone” post-GFC implying a
higher risk of financial distress. Note also that while warning lights are
flashing regarding these vulnerabilities, no emerging market country
was actually in crisis or in the red “distress” zoneby theendof our sample
period. It is, however,worthnoting that the Z-score signaled an increased
vulnerability in Turkey, a fact consistent with the recent crisis in Turkey.
Table 1 also presents some basic summary statistics for other
variables of interest. For example, the average asset size of the
firms in our sample is US$ 287 million with a median value of US$
9 million. The firms in the 25th percentile for size have assets of
US$ 1.3 million while the firms in the 75th percentile have assets
of US$ 226 million with the largest firm with assets that amount
to US$ 1652 million. Average real investment measured by the
change in property, plant and equipment is 9% with firms in the
25th percentile with−7% investment and firms in the 75th percen-
tile with 18% real investment rates.
4. Corporate fragility in emerging markets: firm level evidence
4.1. Firm-observables and corporate fragility
In the previous section we found that in the post-GFC period more
countries are in Altman's grey zone for corporate fragility or barely
above the threshold. In this section we delve further into the firm-level
data and run regressions to examine the link between corporate financial
fragility and leverage as well as the role of firm-characteristics—in partic-
ular firm size. We also examine the impact of macroeconomic and
institutional factors such as exchange rates, economic growth, and finan-
cial globalization interacted with leverage on the corporate distress
scores.
As a first step, we examine the relationship between leverage, firm-
size and other firm-characteristics and the Z-score by estimating the fol-
lowing model19:
Zi;c;t ¼ αi þ δc;t þ β1Leveragei;c;t þ β2SIZEi;c;t þ β3Xi;c;t þ εi;c;t ð2Þ
where Zi,c,t is the Z-score for firm i, country c, year t; Leveragei,c,t is le-
verage for firm i, country c, year t; Xi,c,t are measures of other firm char-
acteristics;αi arefirmfixed effects; δc,t are country-yearfixed effects; β1,
β2, β3 are the coefficients on leverage, size and other firm-
characteristics. The standard errors are clustered at the firm and
country-year level.
We begin by examining the unconditional correlation between le-
verage and the Altman's Z-score, i.e., with a specification that does not19 In the regressions, the variables are Winsorized at 5%. The results are robust to using
1%Winsorization as well as no Winsorization.include compositional controls. In other words, we start by estimating
specification (1), butwithoutfirm and country-yearfixed effects. Unless
otherwise noted our measure of size is log assets. Column 1 of Table 3
examines the impact of leverage, size and real investment (measured
as the change in property, plant and equipment) on the Altman's
Z-score. It shows that leverage is inversely correlated with the Z score,
i.e., scores for firms with high leverage are closer to the distress range.
The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Firm size is negative
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Real investment is positively
correlated with the Z-score but the coefficient is not statistically signif-
icant. The results suggest that the large firms and highly levered firms
are more financially vulnerable.
Column 2 introduces compositional controls in the form of country-
year fixed effects as it may be the case that unobserved heterogeneity
across country-years may drive both the firm-characteristics such as le-
verage and Z-scores over time. The pattern of results remains qualita-
tively similar with negative and statistically significant coefficients on
leverage and firm size and positive and but not significant coefficient
on real investment. While the magnitude of the coefficient on leverage
remains relatively stable, it is interesting to note that the coefficient
on firm size doubles when the country-year fixed effects are included
in the specification.
A potential concernwith the econometric specifications in Column 1
and 2, however, is that the ratio of Book-Value-of-Equity to Total Liabil-
ities, a component of the Altman's Z-score, is by construction negatively
correlated with our measure of leverage. Therefore, one might argue
that the relationship between leverage and the Z-score is mechanically
hard-wired. This subtle point is worth emphasizing as, at first pass, it
may appear that “leverage is regressed on leverage.”
To circumvent this concern, we construct a modified Z-score that
does not include the leverage term and only includes the ratios of work-
ing capital, retained earnings and operating income to total assets.
Higher values of these components drive up the Z-score and are a sign
of improving corporate health (the correlation between the original
Z-score and the modified Z-score is 0.76). Column 3 examines the rela-
tionship between leverage, firm size, real investment and the modified
Altman's Z-score. The regression specification is the same as in Column
1 with the modified Z-score as the dependent variable. The coefficient
on leverage is no longer statistically significant. Firm size, however, re-
mains inversely correlated with the modified Z-score, suggesting that,
for a given level of leverage, larger firms are more financially fragile.
Real investment is positively correlated with firm financial health and
in this case the coefficient is statistically significant.
Column 4 introduces country-year fixed effects to control for unob-
served heterogeneity across countries over time. The pattern of results
remains qualitatively similar for firm size and investment, but the lever-
age coefficient is now positive and statistically significant. Interestingly,
comparing the results in Columns 3 and 4, the magnitude on the coeffi-
cient on firm size almost quadruples when country-year fixed effects
are introduced. Since the results in Columns 1–4 do not control for
time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity at the firm level we go on
to include firm fixed effects. The results are qualitatively similar to
those in Column 4, but the effect of firm size is now eight times larger
than that of the estimations without firm-fixed effects.20 Column 6
introduces country-year and firm fixed effects jointly into the specifica-
tion. Themagnitude of the coefficient on firm size is very similar to that
in Column 5.
Column 7 and 8 introduce a time-invariant dummy for firm size
where a firm is defined as large if its total assets are larger than the
country-year average of total assets in each country-year. While the in-
clusion of this time invariant dummy does not allow us to control for
firm fixed effects, the results with and without country-year fixed20 We also estimated a specification with a control for the return on assets. The coeffi-
cient on firm size remains inversely correlatedwith themodified Z-score while the return
on assets, a measure of profitability, is positively correlated with the modified Z-score.
Table 3
Firm fragility, leverage, and firm size





Leverage −1.496*** −1.447*** 0.167 0.174 0.249** 0.211* 0.183* 0.238** 0.264**
(0.140) (0.138) (0.108) (0.107) (0.125) (0.127) (0.109) (0.107) (0.114)
Firm Size −0.063** −0.112** −0.055*** −0.204*** −1.591*** −1.621*** −0.329** −0.408*** −0.328**
(0.026) (0.0495) (0.019) (0.037) (0.082) (0.081) (0.135) (0.151) (0.163)
Investment 0.033 0.013 0.059*** 0.049* 0.058*** 0.056** 0.057** 0.051* 0.063***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.028) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.016)
Constant 9.079*** 28.41*** 27.56***
(0.454) (0.341) (0.0713)
Observations 11,445 11,425 11,445 11,425 10,496 10,475 11,445 11,425 9966
R-squared 0.023 0.071 0.003 0.057 0.389 0.414 0.002 0.052 0.055
Fixed effects No CY No CY Firm CY & Firm No CY CY
Size is Time variant Time invariant
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default (the regular Z-score in columns 1–2 and themodified Z-score in columns
3–8), and the explanatory variables are leverage, firm size and investment. The specifications of columns 2, 4, 7, and 8 include country-year fixed effects and the specification of column 5
includes country-year andfirmfixed effects. In columns1–6firmsize ismeasured by taking the log of total assets. In columns 6 and 7firmsize ismeasuredwith afirm-specific dummy that
takes a value of one for firms that in each year of the sample have a value of total assets which is above the country-year specific average value for total assets and in column 8 ismeasured










SIZE 2011-2014effects corroborate our previous finding that large firms tend to have
lower Z-scores. In Column 9 we used an alternative measure of time-
invariant firm size. Specifically, we define firms as large on the basis of
sales ranking by applying the samemethodology used in the granularity
regressions that examine the importance of large firms for the
macroeconomy in emerging markets (see Section 5 below).21 Across
these alternative definitions of firm size, the relationship with financial
vulnerability remains negative and highly statistically significant. Large
firms therefore appear to be a key source of corporate financial vulner-
ability in emerging markets.
The inverse relationship between firm-size and financial vulnerabil-
ity is of interest as the financial vulnerability of large firms is of particu-
lar concern to regulators. For example, the IMF's World Economic
Outlook (October 2015) report explicitly states that it is “important to
closely monitor sectors and systemically important firmsmost exposed
to risks and the sectors and large firms closely connected to them, in-
cluding across the financial system, and to prepare for contingencies.”-2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Fig. 2. Correlation between firm fragility and each of leverage and firm size. This figure
plots the coefficients (with 90 and 95% confidence intervals) of the following firm-level




d¼1 β2;dSIZEi;c;t þ εi;c;t where β1,d and
β2,d are time varying coefficients, Z is the Z-score, LEV is leverage, SIZE is the log of total
assets and αi and δc,t are firm and country-year fixed effects4.2. The impact of leverage varies over time while size effect is time-
invariant
Theprevious subsectiondocuments thatfirm size appears to bea key
driver of financial fragility. In this sectionwe examinewhether the rela-
tionship between firm observables (leverage and firm size) and fragility
varies over timeandwhether anyone variable has amore consistent im-
pact on fragility. We find that while the relationship between leverage
and fragility varies over time, the firm characteristic that is consistently
significant and robust to the inclusion of fixed effects is firm size.
As afirst pass,weestimate regressions that allowthe coefficientsof le-
verage and firm size to vary over five different sub-periods (1993–1995,
1996–2002, 2003–2006, 2007–2010, 2011–2014). The rationale for de-
lineating the sub-periods is as follows. Thefirst period, 1993–1995 relates
to the opening of upfinancialmarkets in emergingmarket countries (see
Chari andHenry, 2015) endingwith the Tequila Crisis ofMexico in 1994–
95. The second period 1996–2002 corresponds to a wave of emerging
market crises including the Asian financial crisis, and the Argentine and
Russian crises. The third period, 2003–2007, was characterized by robust
and stable growth in most emerging markets. The fourth period, 2007–21 We use these time-invariant and discrete measures of firm size to make sure that the
negative correlation between firm size and the Z-score is not purely driven bywithin-firm
shocks to the value of total assets (such shocks would create an automatic correlation be-
tween the log of total assets –ourmeasure of firm size- and the denominator of the various
components of the Z score).2010, coincideswith themost virulent phase of theGlobal Financial Crisis
andGreatRecession. Finally,we identify2011–2014as thepost-Global Fi-
nancial Crisis period. These periodswere also characterized by important
institutional changes within emerging market countries.
In the aftermath of theGFC, advanced economieswere characterized
by increases in government borrowing and household and corporate
deleveraging.22 Emerging markets stand in stark contrast. Over 2001–
2007 average credit to the non-financial sector in emerging market
countries remained close to 120% of GDP. The GFC caused a sudden re-
duction in credit, which went from 122% of GDP in 2007 to 109% in
2008. Credit started expanding rapidly in 2009 and reached 175% of
GDP in 2015, a 67-percentage point increase with respect to the 200822 Low global interest rates notwithstanding, the higher leverage led to a rapid increase
in the debt service ratios of emerging market borrowers. In a period when the average
debt service ratio of Advanced Economies decreased from 21 to 18%, the average debt ser-
vice ratio of emerging markets increased from 10 to 12.5%. In a subset of emerging econ-
omies characterized by rapid credit expansion, debt service ratios surpassed the advanced







































































































Fig. 3. Time varying correlation between firm fragility, leverage, and firm size. This figure plots the coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) of the following firm-level regression: Zi;c;t
¼ PTt δtðτt  LEVi;c;tÞ þ
PT
t γtðτt  SIZEi;c;tÞ þ αi þ θc;t þ εi;c;t where δt and γt are time varying coefficients, τt are time dummies, Z is the Z-score, LEV is leverage, SIZE is the log of total
assets and αi and θc, t are firm and country-year fixed effects.trough (Fig. 1). Borrowing by non-financial corporations was a key
driver of this surge in leverage—corporate debt went from 57% to
101% of GDP over 2008–15.23
We estimate the following regression specification across the five
sub-periods (indexed by d):






β2;dSIZEi;c;t þ εi;c;t ð3Þ
The sub period regressions include firm and country-year fixed
effects (αi and δc,t, respectively). Fig. 2 reports the results that show
that the coefficient on leverage is positive and significant between
2003 and 2006, and not statistically significant in other sub-periods.
The pattern of coefficients suggests that the relationship between lever-
age and fragility varies over time. In contrast, the coefficient on firm size
remains negative and statistically significant across all five sub-periods.
The magnitude of the coefficient also remains remarkably stable. These
simple regressions indicate that the relationship between firm size and
corporate fragility is very consistent and robust.
Next, we show that the results described above are not driven by a
particular choice of time period and explore the heterogeneity in the
relationship between firm size, leverage and corporate fragility in detail.









γt τt  SIZEi;c;t
 þ αi þ θc;t þ εi;c;t ð4Þ
where τt are year fixed effects, αi are firm fixed effects, and θc,t are
country-year fixed effects, and δt and γt are parameter estimates. Fig. 323 Over the same period, household debt increased by 12 percentage points and govern-
ment debt increased by 9 percentage points.plots the values of δt andγtwith 95% confidence interval. Thefigure con-
firms that the estimated effect of firm size (right panel) remains quite
stable and that of leverage (left panel) varies over time (albeit is never
statistically significant).








γc ηc  SIZEi;c;t
 þ αi þ θc;t
þ εi;c;t ð5Þ
where ηc is a country fixed effect and all other variables are defined
as above. Again, we see considerable heterogeneity for δc, the coefficient
on leverage (left panel) and limited heterogeneity in the magnitude of
the coefficient for firm size, γc (Fig. 4).









γc;t θc;t  Sizei;c;t
 þ θc;t þ εi;c;t
ð6Þ
The figures once again display a lot of heterogeneity for δct on lever-
age and limited heterogeneity for γct or firm size (Fig. 5).
4.3. Leverage, the macroeconomy and firm size
A natural question arises. Can we explain the observed country-year
heterogeneity? One conjecture is that if firms borrow in foreign cur-
rency, leverage will likely have a particularly adverse impact on corpo-
rate financial fragility in times when the currency depreciates. We test
this hypothesis by interacting leverage with changes in the bilateral ex-





























































































































Fig. 4. Country-specific correlation between firm fragility, leverage, and firm size. This figure plots the coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) of the following firm-level regression:
Zi;c;t ¼
PC
c δcðηc  LEVi;c;tÞ þ
PC
c γcðηc  SIZEi;c;tÞ þ αi þ θc;t þ εi;c;t where δcand γc are country-specific coefficients ηc are country dummies, Z is the Z-score, LEV is leverage, SIZE is the log
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Fig. 5. Country-year specific correlation between firm fragility, leverage, and firm size. This figure plots the coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) of the following firm-level
regression: Zi;c;t ¼
PCT
c;t δc;tðθc;t  LEVi;c;tÞ þ
PCT
c;t γc;tðθc;t  Sizei;c;tÞ þ θc;t þ εi;c;t where δc. tand γc, t are country-year specific coefficients, Z is the Z-score, LEV is leverage, SIZE is the log
of total assets and θc, t are country-year fixed effects.
Table 4
Firm fragility, leverage, and firm size, the role of macroeconomic shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Leverage 0.236** 0.170 0.286 0.170 0.228 −0.0187 0.191 0.343 0.490
(0.117) (0.116) (0.205) (0.266) (0.212) (0.268) (0.518) (0.830) (0.893)
Firm Size −1.586*** −1.627*** −1.552*** −1.587*** −1.586*** −1.604*** −1.575*** −1.582*** −1.615***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.083) (0.086) (0.104) (0.157)
Leverage×ΔEX −1.046** −0.994* −1.181** −1.040** −1.041** −1.106** −1.496*** −1.459** −0.436
(0.487) (0.545) (0.539) (0.485) (0.496) (0.480) (0.545) (0.705) (3.685)
Leverage×GR_GDP 0.884 2.924 1.610 1.861
(2.632) (3.373) (4.612) (6.606)
Leverage×Inflation 0.018 −0.051 −0.064 0.011
(0.069) (0.082) (0.153) (0.110)
Leverage×FINDEV 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Leverage×LMF 0.242 0.210 0.181 0.334
(0.208) (0.233) (0.349) (0.434)
Observations 13,104 13,374 12,226 13,104 13,104 11,045 10,278 5583 3949
R-squared 0.428 0.431 0.426 0.428 0.428 0.444 0.443 0.461 0.518
Firm and Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All All All All All All All Depreciations Appreciations
Exchange rate Bilateral Financially
weighted
Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default measured by the modified Z-score in columns 3–8, and the explanatory
variables are leverage and firm size (the results are robust to controlling for investment) and the interaction between leverage and each of percentage change in the exchange rate (ΔEX),
real GDP growth (GR_GDP), inflation (Inflation), private credit over GDP (FINDEV), and the Lane andMilesi-Ferretti index of financial globalization (LMF). All regressions include country-
year and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in parenthesis. In column 2 we use the financially weighted effective exchange rate com-
puted by Benetrix, Lane and Shambaugh.While we do not have data on the currency composition of firm-level
debt, the finding that currency movements amplify the correlation be-
tween leverage and corporate financial fragility would be consistent
with the presence of currency mismatches. We test this hypothesis by
estimating the following specification:
Zi;c;t ¼ αi þ δc;t þ βLi;c;t þ γ Li;c;t  ΔEXc;t−1
 þ φSIZEi;c;t þ εi;c;t ð7Þ
In this set up, βmeasures the correlation between leverage and firm
fragility when there are no exchange rate movements and γ measures
how the correlation between leverage and firm fragility varies with cur-
rency depreciations (ΔEXc,t−1 is the percentage change in the nominal
exchange rate, where ΔEX N 0 represents a currency depreciation).
Note that the main effect of the exchange rate is captured by the
country-year fixed effects.
Table 4 presents the results. Column 1 shows that the interaction
effect of leverage and currency depreciation is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level (we discuss the economic significance of this
effect in sub section 4.5 below). Note that the inclusion of country-year
fixed effects rules out any concern of direct reverse causality, i.e., the
possibility that an increase in firm fragility leads to currency deprecia-
tion. We also explore whether our baseline results (which use bilateral
exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar) are robust to replacing the bilat-
eral exchange rate with the financial liabilities weighted effective
exchange rate computed by Bénétrix et al. (2015). Column 2 of
Table 4 shows that this is the case.
However, in emerging markets, currency depreciations are often ac-
companied by economic recessions and tighter financial conditions. Our
earlier results on the impact of exchange rates could thus be driven by
the fact that highly leveraged firms suffer more during recessions or,
in the presence of maturity mismatches, are particularly affected by
sudden increases in the interest rate. In column 3 we control for this
possibility by interacting leverage with lagged GDP growth. We find
that the interaction between leverage and economic growth is not sta-
tistically significant while the interaction between leverage and cur-
rency depreciations remains negative and statistically significant.
Many emerging market countries reacted to the crises of the late
1990s with reforms aimed at improving their institutional and macro-
economic framework. Fourteen of the twenty-five countries includedin our sample moved to an inflation-targeting framework between
1997 and 2009. Many countries and also implemented reforms aimed
at improving their domestic capitalmarkets (theAsianBondmarket Ini-
tiative was a specific outcome of the Asian Financial crisis) and promot-
ing financial deepening. In our sample of countries average financial
depth went from 50% in 1995 to 72% in 2014. The period we study
was also characterized by different phases of financial globalization
with an increase of cross-border capital flows over 2002–2007, a col-
lapse over 2007–2009 and a rapid increase in flows to emerging mar-
kets after 2010 (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Next, we test
whether our results are driven by these factors by examining the effects
of leverage conditional on changes in the exchange rate are robust to the
inclusion of the interaction of leverage with (i) lagged inflation, (ii) an
index of financial development, and (iii) the updated Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) index of financial globalization.
Columns 4–6 show that, inflation, financial depth and international
financial integration measured by the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti index
interacted with leverage do not have a statistically significant impact
on Z-scores, while the interaction between leverage and currency
depreciation remains negative and statistically significant. Column7 pre-
sents a full-blownestimationwith all the explanatory variables fromCol-
umns 2–5 and shows that the exchange rate and leverage effect remain
robust. A second salientfinding is that the size variable remains negative,
statistically significant at the 1% levelwith a remarkably stable coefficient
magnitude across all the specifications in Table 4. The pattern once again
corroborates the role of firm size in explaining corporate fragility.
To examinewhether there is a differential interaction effect of lever-
age and exchange rate changes on corporate financial fragility depends
on whether emerging market currencies are strengthening or weaken-
ing, we estimate the regression specification in Column 6 separately for
periods of currency appreciation and depreciations. Columns 8 and 9 in
Table 4 report the results. Column 7 shows that effect of leverage and
change in the exchange rate on Z-scores conditional on currency depre-
ciation is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast,
Column8 shows that the coefficient on the interaction effect and the ex-
change rate change conditional on currency appreciation is not statisti-
cally significant. This pattern corroborates the hypothesis that leverage
interacted with currency depreciation has a statistically significant ad-
verse impact on Z-scores.
Table 5
Firm fragility, leverage, and firm size, the role of the exchange rate in tradable and non-
tradable industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage 0.267 0.131 1.334* −0.745
(0.173) (0.164) (0.744) (0.688)
Firm Size −1.506*** −1.681*** −1.431*** −1.720***
(0.102) (0.0987) (0.121) (0.116)
Leverage×ΔEX −1.409** −0.682 −1.524* −0.971









Observations 5273 7680 4142 6015
R-squared 0.443 0.449 0.456 0.464
Firm and CY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Non-tradable Tradable Non-tradable Tradable
This table shows the results of a set offirm-level regressionswhere thedependent variable
is distance to default measured by themodified Z-score in columns 3–8, and the explana-
tory variables are leverage and firm size (the results are robust to controlling for invest-
ment) and the interaction between leverage and the percentage change in the exchange
rate (ΔEX), real GDP growth (GR_GDP), inflation (Inflation), private credit over GDP
(FINDEV), and the Lane andMilesi-Ferretti index offinancial globalization (LMF). Columns
1 and 3 only include firms that operate in non-tradable sectors and columns 2 and 4 only
include firms that operate in tradable sectors. All regressions include country-year and
firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in
parenthesis.We conducted a few additional tests to ensure the robustness of the
patterns the data reveal. First, an important concern iswhether survivor-
ship bias drives the observed pattern of results. To address this, in Appen-
dix Table A3we re-estimate the specification in Column 1 of Table 4with
firms that survive or are present in the data for different lengths of time.
We limit the sample to firms that are present for at least five years
(column 2), for at least ten years (column 3) and for at least fifteen
years (column 4). Interestingly, the coefficient estimates for both the le-
verage and exchange rate interaction effect and that on firm size rise in
magnitude as we proceed from a sample with a fewer number of years
in Column 2 to a sample with firmswith data for fifteen years in Column
4. Second, we re-estimate the specifications in Table 4 by dropping China
from the sample (Appendix Table A4). The pattern of results remains ro-
bust. Finally, we show that our results are robust to estimating all the
models of Table 4 on a constant sample (Appendix Table A5).
4.4. Leverage, exchange rates and tradability
Unhedged currency exposures for firms in non-tradable industries
such as construction and utilities that access international capital mar-
kets may be particularly adverse. However, currency mismatches may
be less damaging for firms that, by operating in the tradable sector,
may have natural hedges through foreign currency revenues. Pooling
tradable and non-tradable firms into a single specification obscures
such heterogeneity.
To focus on the sector-specific dimension, we estimate Eq. (2)
separately for firms that operate in tradable sectors and firms that
operate in non-tradable sectors.24 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 524 We start by classifying as non-tradable all firms that have a SIC2 code above 39, but
then we also classify as non-tradable firms with SIC2 codes 7 (Agricultural Services),
9 (Fishing, Hunting and Trapping), 15 (Construction - General Contractors & Operative
Builders), 16 (Heavy Construction, Except Building Construction, Contractor), 17 (Con-
struction - Special TradeContractors), 25 (Furniture and Fixtures), 27 (Printing, Publishing
and Allied Industries), and 32 (Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products). This classifica-
tion yields 5888 observations in the tradable sector and 4000 in the non-tradable sector.
Our results are robust to using the simpler above 39 and below split.show that a larger and statistically significant interaction effect be-
tween leverage and exchange rates for non-tradable industries and
a smaller and insignificant coefficient for the tradable sector. In col-
umns 3 and 4 we also include the interaction effects between lever-
age and the percentage change in the exchange rate (ΔEX), real
GDP growth (GR_GDP), inflation (Inflation), private credit over
GDP (FINDEV), and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti index of financial
globalization (LMF). The results show that, again the effect is only
present for firms that operate in non-tradable sectors-the coefficient
on the interaction effect between leverage and the exchange rate
remains negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, the inter-
action effect between leverage and inflation is also negative and sta-
tistically significant for the non-tradable sector. In all regressions of
Table 5, firm size continues to be inversely correlated with the Z-
score for both tradable and non-tradable sectors.
4.5. Attenuation bias and an instrumental variable approach
A point to note is that the magnitude of the interaction effect
between leverage and currency depreciations documented in
Table 4 is small. For instance, consider how a currency depreciation
of 30% may affect a firm whose leverage is one standard deviation
above average. Given that the standard deviation of leverage is
about 70%, a currency depreciation of 30% implies a Z-score reduc-
tion of 0.315 points—we use the interaction effect coefficient from
Column 6 of Table 4 (−1.5*0.30*0.7 = 0.315). This is a very
small effect, b10% of the standard deviation of the modified Z
score. Note that the effect remains small even when we focus on
non-tradable industries. If our variables are measured with error,
our results may suffer from attenuation bias that is amplified by
the presence of firm and country-year fixed effects. Instrumental
variable estimates could address this problem, as well other re-
maining endogenity concerns.
Our instrument is based on world capital flows (Bussière et al.
(2015) and Alfaro et al., 2018). To instrument for the exchange
rate, we interact world capital flows (total foreign liabilities summed
across countries from the IMF, IFS) with a country's sensitivity
to capital flows measured by lagged values of de jure financial
openness. We proxy the financial openness measure by the Chinn
and Ito (2006) index, which is based on the IMF Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The
rationale for this instrument is that world gross financial flows
ought to be independent of local economic conditions in a given des-
tination country and act as a push factor. Country-specific financial
openness measures provide the cross-country variation in the
instrument.
In particular, we compute world capital flows as the sum of eq-
uity (FDI and portfolio) and debt inflows across countries (IMF,
IFS). We then interact this variable that varies over time, with
the lagged country-specific value of the Chinn-Ito index for financial
openness. We normalize the measure by world GDP. We tried
alternative measures that exclude reserves accumulation from total
capital flows. We also used total foreign liabilities capital flows
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti. In addition, we tried pre-sample mea-
sures of the Chinn-Ito index for financial openness (1993, 1995,
2000).
Table 6 documents the relationship between corporate vulnerabil-
ity and leverage, firm size, and exchange rates. Column 1 shows that
the coefficients on the interaction effect between leverage and the
exchange rate and on firm size are negative and statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level. Column 2 reveals a similar pattern of results
for a full-blown specification that includes the full set of controls
discussed in Table 4.
The instrumental variables specification confirms the effectswe doc-
ument in earlier sections about the drivers of corporate vulnerability.
The high values of the Cragg-Donald F statistics reported at the bottom
Table 6
Firm fragility, leverage, and firm size, IV regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leverage 1.209** −0.512 1.114*** −0.559 1.079** −0.604
(0.480) (0.492) (0.430) (0.501) (0.428) (0.499)
Firm Size −1.572*** −1.520*** −1.586*** −1.520*** −1.585*** −1.521***
(0.098) (0.074) (0.098) (0.074) (0.097) (0.074)
Leverage×ΔEX −20.73** −4.957** −24.83*** −5.614** −23.96** −6.113**
(8.241) (2.169) (9.563) (2.458) (9.501) (2.412)
Leverage×GR_GDP 12.31*** 10.62*** 11.25***
(4.646) (4.064) (4.021)
Leverage×Inflation −0.109 −0.110 −0.113
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
Leverage×FINDEV −0.007** −0.009*** −0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Leverage×LMF 0.898*** 1.069*** 1.121***
(0.281) (0.334) (0.330)
Observations 8334 7216 8543 7216 8543 7216
R-squared 0.315 0.463 0.324 0.463 0.334 0.462
Firm and CY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All All All All All All
Exchange rate is Bilateral rate with US$ Financially weighted effective exchange rate
Instruments World Capital Flows×Financial Openness World Capital Flows×Financial Openness
and liability weighted $XR of main financial partners
Cragg-Donald F Statistics 68 341 72 436 36 227
P value of Sargan test 0.22 0.25
This table shows the results of a set of firm-level regressions where the dependent variable is distance to default measured by the modified Z-score in columns 3–8, and the explanatory
variables are leverage and firm size (the results are robust to controlling for investment) and the interaction between leverage and each of percentage change in the exchange rate (ΔEX),
real GDP growth (GR_GDP), inflation (Inflation), private credit over GDP (FINDEV), and the Lane andMilesi-Ferretti index offinancial globalization (LMF). Columns 1 and 2use the bilateral
exchange rate with the US$, columns 3–6 use the financially weighted effective exchange rate computed by Benetrix, Lane and Shambaugh. In columns 1–4 the exchange rate is instru-
mented with world capital flows interacted with financial openness. Columns 5 and 6 estimate an overidentified model in which the exchange rate is instrumented with world capital
flows interacted with financial openness and a financially weighted index of the dollar exchange rate of the main capital exporters. All regressions include country-year and firm fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in parenthesis.of the table show that our results are not affected by a weak instrument
problem.25
The magnitudes of the coefficients in the instrumental variable re-
gressions are much larger alleviating concerns about attenuation bias.
Quantifying the interaction effect of leverage and exchange rates for a
30% depreciation results in a Z-score fall of 4.8*0.3*0.7 = 1 point. This
means that if the currency depreciates by 30%, the Z score drops by 1
point or about one-third of a standard deviation in the distribution of
the modified Z-score.
We estimated the specifications in Columns 1 and 2 using the alter-
native financially weighted exchange rate measure of Bénétrix et al.
(2015). The results remain robust (Columns 3 and 4). One advantage
of using the financially weighted exchange rate is that this effective
exchange rate allows us to use an additional instrument and thus assess
the validity of our IV strategy with an over-identification test.
Specifically, we propose a second instrument that uses time-
invariant currency weights computed by Bénétrix et al. (2015) to
build an exogenous shock to the financially weighted exchange rate.
To fix the ideas, consider a world with three currencies: the peso, U.S.
dollar, and the euro. The financially-weighted effective exchange rate
for the peso would be:
Ep ¼ wEp=$ þ 1−wð ÞEp=€ ð8Þ
where Ep/$ is pesos per dollar, Ep/€ is pesos per euro, and w is the
weight of the dollar in the effective exchange rate for the peso. Also de-
fine E$/€ as dollars per euro which we assume is exogenous to develop-
ments in the country that issues the peso. As Ep/€ = Ep/$Ep/€, we can25 Note that sincewe are instrumenting an interaction, the instrument is itself interacted
with leverage.therefore rewrite the effective exchange rate as:
Ep ¼ Ep=$ wþ 1−wð ÞE$=€
  ð9Þ
Given that currency weights tend to be relatively stable over time,
the preceding analysis implies that we can use (1−w)E$/€ as an instru-
ment for the effective exchange rate for the peso, Ep. Given that we have
more than three currencies, we instrument the financially weighted ex-
change rate of country i in time t (Ei,t) with (1−wi)EUS,t, wherewi is the
time-invariant (computed as an average over 1990–2010) of theUS dol-
lar share in country i's financiallyweighted exchange rate and EUS,t is the
effective exchange rate for the US.26
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 show that the results of columns 3 and 4
are robust to including this instrument together with the world capital
flows instrument of Alfaro et al. (2018). The interaction effect between
leverage and the new instrument for the exchange rate is negative and
significant as is the unconditional effect on leverage. Size also continues
to be inversely correlated with corporate vulnerability. The coefficient
on growth interacted with leverage is positive and significant. The bot-
tom rows of the table show that the instruments are not weak and that
the Sargan test does not reject the validity of our over-identifying
assumptions.
5. Corporate fragility in emerging markets and the macroeconomy
A key question is whether the increase in corporate leverage
documented above can have large negative macroeconomic conse-
quences with monetary policy normalization in advanced economies.
Acharya et al. (2015) suggest that this normalization could lead to
capital outflows from emerging markets and potential problems26 Note thatwe could havedone this exercisewith any other currency, butwe picked the
dollar as it is the currency that tends to have the largest weight in the financially weighted










Observations 486 486 486
Number of countries 26 26 26
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Sample 1994–2014 1994–2014 1994–2014
This table reports a set of regression in which the dependent variable is per-capita GDP
growth and the explanatory variables are granularity (G) and its first two lag (L.G and
L2.G). All the regressions control for country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at the country level in parenthesis.
Table 8
Fragility and firm size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage Solvency Liquidity Z-Score
Large −15.82*** 1.737 0.392 0.124
(2.606) (1.648) (0.944) (0.265)
Observations 44,104 38,741 39,271 16,653
Sample All All All All
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports a set of regression in which the dependent variables are various mea-
sures of potential or realized fragility (leverage, solvency, liquidity, and distance to de-
fault) and the explanatory variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for large
firms (Large). All the regressions control for country and year fixed effects. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in parenthesis.
27 As before there are tradeoffs in the choice of the threshold x. If the threshold is too low
therewill be too few “large” firms and if the threshold is too high therewill bemany coun-
tries in our sample with few listed firms that do not reach a higher threshold.associated with the presence of currency mismatches in firm balance
sheets.
Note that in all the specifications in Tables 3–5 that included firm
size, sizewas a significant predictor of financial vulnerability. Moreover,
the coefficient was highly statistically significant. The inverse correla-
tion between firm size and the Altman's Z-score (both the standard
and modified versions), suggest that in emerging markets firm size or
the extent of granularity in the firm-level datamay be a novel and pow-
erful indicator of financial vulnerabilities.
Hence, we study macroeconomic vulnerabilities by focusing on the
behavior of large firms. Specifically, we proceed in two steps. First, we
follow Gabaix (2011) and show that idiosyncratic shocks to large
firms are significantly correlated with GDP growth in our sample of
emerging markets. Second, we test whether large firms are particularly
vulnerable to exchange rate movements. We find that large firms are,
on average, less leveraged than smaller firms. However, we also find
that the more-leveraged large firms are more vulnerable to exchange
rate shocks compared to equally-leveraged smaller firms. This evidence
is consistent with the idea that large firms make a greater use of
foreign currency borrowing and that they are not fully hedged against
exchange ratemovements.While this result holds for the average coun-
try in our sample, we also find that there is substantial cross-country
heterogeneity.
5.1. Granularity in emerging markets
Gabaix (2011) shows that if the distribution of firm size can be ap-
proximated with a fat-tailed power law (formally P(S N x) = ax−ξ
where S is firm size and ξ ≥ 1) idiosyncratic firm-level shocks can play
a key role in explaining aggregate fluctuations. He builds a “granularity”
index that captures idiosyncratic shocks for the largest 100USfirms and
shows that this index is closely correlated with overall US GDP growth
(Table A6 in the Appendix shows that this correlation is robust to in-
cluding additional controls).
According to Gabaix, granularity effects are likely to be even more
important in countries that are less diversified than the United States.
He mentions several emerging market countries and suggests that “It
would be interesting to transpose the present analysis to those coun-
tries” (Gabaix, 2011 p. 737). We take this suggestion seriously and
build a granularity index for our sample of 26 emerging market
countries.








where Si,t−1 measures sales of firm i, Yi,t−1 is GDP, gi,t is the growth
rate of firm i (defined as the growth rate of the sales to employeesratio) and gt is the simple average of the growth rate of the largest Q
firms in the economy (with Q ≥ K, and where firm size is measured by
sales). Gabaix sets K = 100 and experiments with Q = 100 and Q =
1000. When Q = 100, the index is equal to the weighted growth rate
of the 100 largest firms minus the (simple) average growth rate of
these same firms. When Q = 1000, the index is equal to the weighted
growth rate of the 100 largest firmsminus the (simple) average growth
rate of the largest 1000 firms. It should be noted that the weights (Si;t−1Yi;t−1)
do not add up to one because the weights are computed for a subset of
firms and the numerator is sales and the denominator is GDP.
In order to build a granularity index for our sample of emerging
markets we need to address two issues. The first issue relates to
data limitations. As mentioned above, Gabaix measures firm growth
as the growth rate of the sales-to-employees ratio. Unfortunately,
we do not have a good coverage of firms with data on total employ-
ment. Therefore, we measure firm growth by focusing on the growth
rate of total sales. Our measure is a good approximation of the sales-
to-employees growth rate as long as most of the variance in the ratio
used by Gabaix arises from variations in sales rather than in varia-
tions of employment.
The second issue relates to the definition of “large” firms in an
emerging market context. While it is reasonable to assume that, in a
large and diversified economy like the United States, the largest 100
firms are indeed very large, this assumption is problematic in smaller
and less diversified emerging market countries.
One possible way to address this issue is to simply use a smaller
number of firms for all countries in our sample. In choosing this number
however the number of firms needs to be large enough to capture some
variability in idiosyncratic shocks and cover a meaningful share of over-
all GDP. Among the various possible thresholds, the largest number that
allows us to include all the countries in our sample is 25.
An alternative strategy is to use a criterion based on the share of total
sales over GDP. For instance, we can rank firms in descending order of
size and impose a cumulative sales-to-GDP ratio threshold. Formally,
let f1,c,t be total sales of the largest firm (by sales) in country c, year t,
f2,c,t, the sales of the second largest, and fn,c,t the sales of the nth largest
firm. Let x be a threshold in terms of cumulated sales of over GDP.






We experimented, with different thresholds and found that most
country-years in our sample reach the level of 20% of the cumulative
sales-to-GDP ratio.27 One issue is that in countries with high degrees
Table 9
Leverage, depreciation and firm size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leverage −0.0261 −0.0451 0.342 −0.111 −0.129 −0.284
(0.129) (0.129) (0.277) (0.147) (0.142) (0.217)
Leverage×ΔEX −0.069 −0.097 −0.793*** −0.0914 −0.0361 −0.0388
(0.074) (0.073) (0.152) (0.0858) (0.0742) (0.0751)
Large −748.2*** −991.3*** −988.7*** −771.1***







Leverage×ΔEX × Large −0.866*** −0.823***
(0.177) (0.170)
Observations 40,674 40,674 8616 31,024 40,674 20,504
Number of firms 0.108 0.124 0.288 0.121 0.124 0.241
Sample All All Large Firms Small Firms All Largest 150
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CY FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports a set of regression in which the dependent variable is sales growth and the explanatory variables are leverage, change in in the exchange rate, firm size and the inter-
actions among these variables. All the regressions control for firm fixed effects, column 1 controls for country and year fixed effects, and specifications 2–6 control for country-year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in parenthesis.of concentration, a very small number of firms are sufficient to breach
the threshold.
In the end, we adopt an intermediate strategy: we define as large,
the largest firms for whom cumulative sales are below 20% of GDP.
However, if b25 firms are sufficient to reach this threshold, our defini-
tion of large is the largest 25 firms. As we do not want to include more
firms than what Gabaix includes for the US, we limit the number of
large firms to 100. Summing up, we rank firms by sales and we define





b0:2, and i ≤ 100. In Table 7 we
regress GDP growth over the granularity index controlling for country
and year fixed effects and confirm Gabaix's intuition that granularity
would be positively correlated with GDP growth in emerging market
countries.
5.2. Large firms and exchange rate vulnerabilities
Having established that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms are corre-
latedwith GDP growth,we nowexaminewhether leveraged large firms
are more vulnerable to currency depreciations. As a first step, we check
if there are differences in leverage and other potential measures of fra-
gility between large and smaller firms. Column 1 of Table 8 shows that
compared to smaller firms, lower levels of leverage characterize the
large firms in the sample. Columns 2–4 show that there are no statisti-
cally significant differences in othermeasures of corporate financial vul-
nerabilities such as solvency, liquidity, and the Z-score.
While large firms have lower leverage with respect to smaller firms,
it is possible that they have an “unhealthier” type of leverage. Specifi-
cally, in the presence of fixed costs it is easier for large firms to borrow
abroad, and foreign borrowing tends to be in foreign currency. There
is evidence that large firms issue international bonds not only tofinance
investment projects but also to engage into carry trade activities (Bruno
and Shin, 2017, Caballero et al., 2015). Lack of data on the currency com-
position of firm liabilities prevents us from directly testing if this is the
case for our full sample of countries, but there is some evidence that
(i) large Brazilian firms are more likely to have foreign currency debt
compared to smaller firms (Bonomo et al., 2003); (ii) large firms in
the U.S. use more foreign currency derivatives (Allayannis and
Weston, 2001); (iii) large firms in Finland are more likely to borrow in
foreign currencies than small firms (Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001);
and (iv) larger firms hold a higher fraction of dollar debt in a set offirms from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (Bleakley
and Cowan, 2008).
Given thatwe cannot test directlywhether currencymismatches are
potentially more problematic for larger firms, we test whether sales
growth (associated with GDP growth in the granularity regressions of
Table 7) respondsmore to exchange ratemovements in large and lever-
aged firms than in equally leveraged smaller firms. As a first step we es-
timate the following model for our full sample of firms:
GR Salesi;c;t ¼ Leveragei;c;t β þ γΔEXctð Þ þ δLargei;c;t þ θΔEXct þ αi þ εi;ct;t ð12Þ
where GR_Salesi,c,t is sales growth in firm i, country c, year t, LEVi,c,t is
leverage,ΔEXct is the percentage change in the exchange rate in country
c, year t (positive values are depreciations), LARGEi,c,t is a dummy vari-
able that takes a value of one for large firms (defined as above), and αi
are firm fixed effects. Since we have firm fixed effects, Large captures
the effect of firms that were small and become large.
Column 1 of Table 9 shows that firm size (Large) is negatively corre-
lated with sales growth, but that the interaction between leverage and
currency depreciation is not statistically significant and neither are the
main effects of depreciation and leverage. The lack of a significant effect
on the interaction between leverage and currency depreciationsmay be
due to the fact that for the average firm in our sample the negative effect
of depreciation is not linked to the presence of negative balance sheet
effects brought about by the presence of foreign currency debt. Alterna-
tively, the lack of statistical significancemay be due to the fact that firms
that have currency mismatches are less leveraged on average. As we
saw earlier, large firms are less leveraged and may have larger shares
of foreign currency debt. When we augment the model with country-
yearfixed effects (a specification that does not allow us to separately es-
timate the effect of the exchange rate change,ΔEX), we find results that
are essentially identical to those of the model without country-year
fixed effects (compare the first two columns of Table 9).
Next, we estimate our model with country-year fixed effects sepa-
rately for large and small firms. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 show that
the interaction between leverage and exchange rate movements is sta-
tistically significant for large firms and are not statistically significant for
smaller firms.
In column 3 of Table 9, we find that the interaction coefficient on le-
verage and the exchange rate takes a value of−0.8. This means that, all
else equal, a currency depreciation of 30% reduces sales for the large













Fig. 6. Coefficient of the parameter ψ. This figure plots the equation the coefficient of the
Parameter ψ of Eq. 13 estimated one country at a time. (the model does not include
country-year fixed effects but includes with year fixed effects)firm with average leverage (the average for large firms is 55% in our
sample) by approximately 13% (55*0.3*0.8 = 13.2%). Assume that
these large firms have sales that amount to 50% of GDP. The granularity
regressions of Table 7 (column 1) suggest that if there is a 1% shock to
sales of the largest firms with total sales accounting for 50% of GDP,
GDP growth will decrease by 0.3 percentage points (0.591/2). These
back-of-the-envelope calculations imply that the GDP growth effects
of a 30% depreciationwill be a decrease in growth of 4 percentage points
(0.3*13.2 = 3.96).28
In column 5 of Table 9, we pool all our observations but allow for the
differential effect of firm size by estimating the following model:
GR Salesi;c;t ¼ LEVi;c;t β þ γΔEXct þ ϕLargei;c;t þ ψLargei;c;t  ΔEXct
 
þ δLargei;c;t δþ λΔEXctð Þ þ αi þ χc;t þ εi;ct;t
ð13Þ
where χc,t is a country-year fixed effect and all other variables are
defined as above. In this case our parameter of interest is ψ, which cap-
tures how firm size affects the impact on sales of the interaction be-
tween depreciation and leverage. We find that ψ is negative, large in
absolute value, and statistically significant. This confirms that the inter-
action between leverage and currency depreciations in absolute value is
significantly larger for large firms.
Given that our panel is highly unbalancedwith some countries in the
samplewith N400 listed firmswhile others with only 20 listed firms, we
re-estimate ourmodel by keeping amaximumof 150firmsper country-
year. The results remain near identical to what we obtain for the full
sample of firms (compare columns 5 and 6 of Table 9).
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that many large
firms may have unhedged foreign currency liabilities and are thus28 Note that 30% is larger than our sample average of 7% and is about twice as large as the
typical currency depreciation but it is not an extreme event in emergingmarket countries.
Note that the average depreciation, conditional on having a depreciation in our sample is
15% and N10% of our observations have depreciation N30%. Currency crises are usually as-
sociated with monthly depreciation of 25%, which is well above the 30% annual deprecia-
tion that we consider. If we redo our back of the envelope estimations using the average
depreciation in our sample, i.e., 7%, we find that the average depreciation is associated
with a decrease in growth of approximately one percentage point (55*0.07*0.8 = 3.08%
and 0.3*3.08 = 0.924).vulnerable to sudden currency depreciations. Given our previous evi-
dence that idiosyncratic shocks to largefirms affect overall economic ac-
tivity, one is tempted to conclude that a sudden capital flows reversal
could lead to very adverse effects on real output in emerging markets.
Such an adverse conclusion is however mitigated by the fact that,
while the results of Table 9 are valid for the average emerging market
country, there is substantial heterogeneity among the countries in-
cluded in our sample. Fig. 6 reports the point estimates of the parameter
ψ obtained by estimating Eq. 13 (without the country-yearfixed effects)
separately for 14 countries in our sample. The point estimates range be-
tween −8 (Malaysia) and 15 (Philippines). They are negative for 10
countries and positive for 4 countries. Thus, there is substantial cross-
country heterogeneity and one challenge for future research will be to
identify the drivers of this heterogeneity.
6. Conclusion
Using a rich firm-level dataset, this paper examines the surge in cor-
porate leverage in emerging markets after the global financial crisis
(GFC). The post-GFC period shows many emerging market economies
close to or in the Altman Z-score “grey zone” implying a higher risk of
corporate financial distress. We document a striking and robust empir-
ical link between firm size and financial fragility and that currency de-
preciations amplify the vulnerability of large firms in our sample. A
novel finding is that while the relationship between firm-leverage and
distress scores varies over time, the relationship between firm size
and corporate vulnerability is relatively time-invariant. In sum, all else
equal, large firms in emerging markets are more financially vulnerable.
Given our findings about the relationship between firm size and fi-
nancial fragility, a natural question arises about whether large firms
are also systemically important. Following Gabaix (2011), we find that
at a granular level, there is a positive and significant correlation be-
tween idiosyncratic shocks to the sales growth of large firms and overall
GDP growth in our emergingmarkets sample. Largefirmsmay therefore
have the potential to transmit corporate distress to other firms in the
economy through network effects and other spillovers. Although the
large firms in our sample consistently have less leverage, the negative
impact currency is more acute for the sales growth of large firms com-
pared to similarly levered smaller firms, albeit with substantial cross-
country heterogeneity in the observed impacts.
To conclude, credit to emerging market firms has witnessed an un-
precedented and rapid increase since the GFC. Gaining a better under-
standing of the relationship among corporate leverage, firm size and
financial fragility in emerging market firms is of key policy relevance.
Given the systemic importance of large and highly levered firms, our
results suggest that policymakers ought to closely monitor this subset
of emerging market firms.
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his table shows average leverage and Z-scores each country over time. The colo
oing through several shades of orange yellow. Jordan's 1992–2014 averaged u(1)2008-14 1992-2014 2003-07 2008-14
74% 6.18 7.38 5.62
94% 5.76 6.13 5.88
93% 6.45 6.44 6.20
103% 5.59 5.58 5.28
44% 6.53 6.58 6.77
55% 6.22 6.49 6.30
118% 5.73 5.62 5.55
72% 6.42 6.36 7.13
41.579.535.5
63% 6.95 6.95 7.77
89% 6.73 6.26 5.53
128% 6.95 7.47 5.04
84% 5.17 5.26 5.44
68% 7.11 7.23 6.99
131% 6.28 6.02 6.11
56% 7.79 8.76 7.60
54% 6.83 6.71 6.88
110% 4.96 5.58 6.11
66% 6.73 6.80 7.03
83% 5.56 6.21 6.32
124% 6.54 6.30 5.80
116% 6.28 6.51 6.18
Altman's EM Z-scoree
r scalemoves from red (for low Z-scores and high leverage) to green (for high Z-sco
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ietnam 79% 13%VThis table showswhat percentage of a country's economy is captured byfirms in our sample. Column 1 reports – by country – the total sales infirms in our sample divided by the country's
total market capitalization, as measured by the World Bank. Column 2 shows the ratio of total market capitalization and GDP in each country.



























Fi(1) (2) (3) (4)verage 0.236** 0.332*** 0.450*** 0.773***
(0.117) (0.127) (0.158) (0.188)rm Size −1.586*** −1.610*** −1.596*** −1.758***
(0.0732) (0.0818) (0.104) (0.149)verage×ΔEX −1.046** −1.282** −1.891*** −2.692***
(0.487) (0.555) (0.671) (0.734)bservations 13,104 10,082 7037 4055
-squared 0.428 0.380 0.364 0.378mple Original Firms which are in the sample for at least
5 years 10 years 15 yearsThis table estimates themodel of column 1, Table 4 (reproduced in Column 1 of this table) by restricting the analysis to firms that are in the sample of at least 5 years (column 2), 10 years
(column 3), and 15 years (column 4). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in parenthesis, *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1
Table A4
Dropping China from the sample(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)verage 0.313** 0.251 0.875** 0.231 0.209 0.329
(0.123) (0.214) (0.348) (0.216) (0.288) (0.604)rm Size −1.593*** −1.593*** −1.588*** −1.595*** −1.612*** −1.603***
(0.0788) (0.0785) (0.0791) (0.0790) (0.0889) (0.0892)verage×ΔEX −1.177** −1.250** −1.311** −1.130** −1.244** −1.541***
(0.519) (0.548) (0.523) (0.525) (0.518) (0.556)verage×GR_GDP 1.229 2.999
(2.708) (3.478)verage×Inflation −0.141 −0.0880
(0.0879) (0.109)verage×FINDEV 0.00105 0.000108
(0.00236) (0.00346)verage×LMF 0.121 0.158
(0.217) (0.248)bservations 11,391 11,336 11,391 11,391 9635 9630
-squared 0.418 0.419 0.419 0.418 0.435 0.435rm and Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
mple All All All All All AllSaThis table estimates the models of Table 4 dropping Chinese firms from the sample. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in parenthesis, *** p b 0.01,
** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1Table A5
Constant sample(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)verage 0.357*** 0.215 0.586* 0.407* 0.209 0.191
(0.130) (0.236) (0.322) (0.238) (0.281) (0.518)rm Size −1.586*** −1.581*** −1.582*** −1.585*** −1.585*** −1.575***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)verage×ΔEX −1.210** −1.391** −1.248** −1.237** −1.218** −1.496***
(0.520) (0.555) (0.518) (0.531) (0.510) (0.545)verage×GR_GDP 2.481 2.924
(2.957) (3.373)verage×Inflation −0.0613 −0.051
(0.0848) (0.082)verage×FINDEV −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.00)verage×LMF 0.129 0.210
(0.215) (0.233)bservations 10,278 10,278 10,278 10,278 10,278 10,278
-squared 0.443 0.443 0.443 0.443 0.443 0.443rm and Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
mple All All All All All AllSaThis table estimates the models of Table 4 using the same sample of firms in all regressions (that of column 6). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in
parenthesis, *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1
Table A6




































Li(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)0.829* 0.478* 0.609** 0.479** 0.661** 0.602** 0.588**







(3.353)bservations 197 452 462 462 462 467 467
-squared 0.497 0.515 0.492 0.509 0.533 0.481 0.483
ountry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ear fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
mple 1994–2014SaThis table reports a set of regressionwhich shows that the results of the granularity regressions of Table 7 are robust to including additional controls. Robust standarderrors clustered at the
firm and country-year level in parenthesis, *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1Table A7
Leverage, depreciation and firm size, excluding China from the sample(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)verage 0.123 0.112 0.389 0.004 −0.028 −0.194
(0.133) (0.134) (0.282) (0.152) (0.149) (0.225)verage×ΔEX −0.082 −0.107 −0.804*** −0.0965 −0.044 −0.044
(0.074) (0.073) (0.150) (0.0857) (0.074) (0.075)rge −612.4*** −840.5*** −837.1*** −750.0***
(36.86) (47.09) (47.14) (45.99)EX −4.594
(5.096)rge×ΔEX 16.12 9.473
(15.99) (15.70)verage×Large 0.537* 0.671**
(0.281) (0.312)verage×ΔEX × Large −0.863*** −0.830***
(0.167) (0.168)bservations 31,454 31,454 8292 22,304 31,454 19,095
umber of firms 0.100 0.119 0.260 0.127 0.120 0.197
mple All All Large Firms Small Firms All Largest 150
rm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Y FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCThis table reports a set of regression similar to those of Table 9 but excluding China from the sample. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm and country-year level in
parenthesis, *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1Table A8
Name and description of variableVariable Description Sourceltman's EM Z-score 6.56 × 1 + 3.26 × 2 + 6.72 × 3 + 1.05 × 4 + 3.25
X1 = working capital/ total assets, X2 = retained earnings /total assets, X3 = operating income/total assets,
X4 = book value of equity /total liabilities.Worldscope, Osirisebt-to-equity ratio Total debt to common equity Worldscope, Osiris
verage Total debt to common equity Worldscope, Osiris
ze Log(total assets) Worldscope, Osiris
vestment Δ property, plant & equipment Worldscope, Osiris
EX % change in nominal exch. rate (bilateral rate vs USD, N0 means appreciation) World Bank, WDIFinancial liabilities weighted effective exchange rate Benetrix, Lane, and Shambaugh (2015)
R Real GDP growth World Bank, WDI
flation Inflation World Bank, WDI
NDEV Private credit to GDP World Bank, WDI
F Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) index of financial globalization Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)Granularity index (see pp. 25–27) Worldscope, Osiris
rge (Tables 8, 9) Dummy if firm large (see pp. 26–27) Worldscope, Osiris
lvency EBITDA to total liabilities Worldscope, Osiris
quidity Current to total liabilities Worldscope, Osiris
Table A8 (continued)VariableSaDescription Sourceles to market cap Total sales of firms in our sample to each country's total market cap Worldscope, Osiris, World Bank
arket cap to GDP Each country's total market cap to GDP World BankMReferences
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